#### Enhancing Security through Modularization A Counterfactual Analysis of Vulnerability Propagation and Detection Precision

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
- \* University of Waterloo
- Victoria University of Wellington

tl;dl: more modular libraries can lead to more secure software




LOCK PICKING WORK SHOP

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#### 3rd-party libraries are awesome!




#### But they come at a cost: Security vulnerabilities!

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## Software Composition Analysis (SCA) to the rescue

PAGE 5

## Software Composition Analysis (SCA) to the rescue




**Dependency** Tree

**CVE** Database


### Software Composition Analysis (SCA) to the rescue



## Software Composition Analysis (SCA) to the rescue



Too many false positives







*Call graph* analysis is **expensive** 

Rely on **reported** CVEs


## pkg:mvn/org.json/json used by >1k other libraries




### CVE-2022-45688: vulnerability in the XML transformer




## But I don't need the XML stuff!



## What if clients *could* reference only what they need?




## What if clients *could* reference only what they need?



= What if libraries were more modularized?

#### Actually most clients do not need the whole library!



Only **6%** of clients use functionalities from all modules Fewer false alarms from SCA tools

 $\bigcirc$ 

Smaller attack surface due to dependencies

If libraries were more modularized

> Less worry about dormant/undiscovered vulnerabilities

## We need study subjects



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### We need study subjects, but ...



Hard to find a large number of libraries *transitioned* from monolith to modular



Hard to control the confounding factors



We opted for a simulation-based counterfactual analysis






We *simulate* library **modularization** 

*Measure* security metrics **before and after** modularization

# Modularization can substantially increase the effectiveness of metadata-based SCA tools








SCA precision reached 71% after modularization (before: 35%) **94.5%** of safe\* clients would not receive false security alerts

More than half of the modules (51%) *become safe*\* after modularization

# Modularization can substantially increase the effectiveness of metadata-based SCA tools







*SCA precision* reached **71%** after modularization (before: 35%) **94.5%** of safe\* clients would not receive false security alerts More than half of the modules (51%) *become safe*\* after modularization

### Modularization has great potential to isolate the vulnerabilities







*SCA precision* reached **71%** after modularization (before: 35%) **94.5%** of safe\* clients would not receive false security alerts **More than half** of the modules (51%) *become safe\** after modularization

### Modularization can greatly enhance security of client deployments



**78.26%** of statically safe clients are **no longer susceptible** to attacks targeting *inactive vulnerabilities* 



Public attack surface shrinks by **64%** after modularization

Gadget Chains: Attacks Targeting Inactive Vulnerabilities

0-0-0-0-0-0-0

### Modularization can greatly enhance security of client deployments



78.26% of statically safe clients are **no longer susceptible** to attacks targeting *inactive vulnerabilities* 




Public attack surface shrinks by **64%** after modularization

Public Methods Non-public Methods

#### Public API surface shrinks by 64% after modularization


Client


## Our modularization can save *org.json*'s clients from the XML vulnerability



## What is the source of our numbers?

## What modularization technique do we use?





## We need a notion of *dependency graph*


## We need a graph **partitioning algorithm**

#### We use *constant pool* references to construct *dependency graphs*


#### Constant pool:

conseance pe	000.		
#2 = C1	lass	#290	// org/json/XML\$1
#3 = Me	ethodref	#2.#2 <mark>91</mark>	// org/json/XML\$1." <init>":(Ljava/lang/String;)V</init>
# <b>7</b> = Me	ethodref	#76.#295	// org/json/XML.codePointIterator:(Ljava/lang/String;)Ljava/lang/Iterable;
19 = Me	ethodref	#76.#309	// org/json/XML.mustEscape:(I)Z
#34 = Me	ethodref	#137.#319	// org/json/XMLTokener.unescapeEntity:(Ljava/lang/String;)Ljava/lang/String;
#35 = C1	lass	#320	// org/json/JSONException
#37 = Me	ethodref	#35.#291	// org/json/JSONException." <init>":(Ljava/lang/String;)V</init>
#42 = Me	ethodref	#137.#325	// org/json/XMLTokener.nextToken:()Ljava/lang/Object;
#43 = F	ieldref	<b>#76.#326</b>	// org/json/XML.BANG:Ljava/lang/Character;
#44 = Me	ethodref	#137.#327	// org/json/XMLTokener.next:()C
#4 <mark>6</mark> = Me	ethodref	#137.# <mark>32</mark> 9	// org/json/XMLTokener.skipPast:(Ljava/lang/String;)V
#47 = Me	ethodref	#137.# <mark>33</mark> 0	// org/json/XMLTokener.back:()V
#50 = M€	ethodref	#137.#333	// org/json/XMLTokener.nextCDATA:()Ljava/lang/String;
<b>#51</b> = Me	ethodref	#334.# <mark>335</mark>	// org/json/XMLParserConfiguration.getcDataTagName:()Ljava/lang/String;
#52 = Me	ethodref	#71.#336	// org/json/JSONObject.accumulate:(Ljava/lang/String;Ljava/lang/Object;)Lorg/json/JSONObject;
#54 = M€	ethodref	#137.#338	// org/json/XMLTokener.syntaxError:(Ljava/lang/String;)Lorg/json/JSONException;
#55 = M€	ethodref	#137.# <mark>33</mark> 9	// org/json/XMLTokener.nextMeta:()Ljava/lang/Object;
# <b>57</b> = F	ieldref	#76.#341	// org/json/XML.LT:Ljava/lang/Character;
<b>#58 = F</b>	ieldref	#76.#342	// org/json/XML.GT:Ljava/lang/Character;
#59 = Fi	ieldref	#76.#343	// org/json/XML.QUEST:Ljava/lang/Character;

### We use *constant pool* references to construct *dependency graphs*



We need a proper modularization technique for reliable results






We use **constant pool** references to construct the *dependency graphs* 


We need a graph partitioning algorithm

### The resulting modules should not have dependency cycles




## Convert the dependency graph to a DAG, and partition that

We need a proper modularization technique for reliable results




We use *constant pool* references to construct the *dependency <u>DAG</u>s* 



## We need a **DAG** *partitioning algorithm*


We need a proper modularization technique for reliable results



We use *constant pool* references to construct the *dependency DAGs*  We use **dagP\*** to partition dependency graphs *without introducing cycles* 


# Are the created modules balanced?

#### Yes: module sizes resulting from dagP are reasonably balanced




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
### Do the created modules align with existing hierarchies?




#### Yes: modules are well-aligned with the current library hierarchies.












libraries.io

## Exploiting vulnerabilities is often more challenging than it initially appears

Have to go through **two classes** *to hit a vulnerability* (median)



Only **one class** is *causing* the *vulnerability* (median)

**95%** of classes are *public* 

## Are you a library developer?

Try to release smaller coherent artifacts and let people decide what they need



You can use our modularization approach as a starting point

## Do you use large third-party libraries?



You also can use our technique to break large artifacts

Use smaller artifacts (sometimes from the same project!) when possible

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- Olena Panasovska

#### Photos from Patrick Lam collection

## Hot Takes

- 1. Many libraries out there are too big.
- 2. Humans shouldn't have to do grunt work to modularize libraries.
- 3. dotnet is better than Java (in terms of clients not including extra libraries).